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Summary Of Events, Iran-contra Affair Investigation, Aug.
25-sept. 1
by Deborah Tyroler
Category/Department: General
Published: Friday, September 4, 1987
Aug. 25: In testimony released to the media, Alan D. Fiers, chief of the CIA's Central America
task force, told Congress he knew about the secret air resupply operation by former White House
aide Oliver North that aided the Nicaraguan contras in 1986, but he acknowledged that he sat
silently last October while superiors gave "cute" answers to Congress that hid the US government
role. In a closed session Aug. 5 of the House-Senate Iran- contra committees, Fiers was asked
about his actions last Oct. 14 during a House Permanent Select Intelligence Committee meeting
where members questioned Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams and Claire George, CIA
deputy director for operations, about the shootdown the previous week of a C123K cargo plane
over Nicaragua that was piloted by Americans. Abrams denied there was any US government
involvement in the flight and George said the CIA was not involved directly or indirectly in the
operation. Fiers testified that he was "taken aback" by Abrams' sweeping denial of US involvement
since Fiers knew that North was directing the privately run operation. Fiers also knew that one of
his subordinates, the CIA station chief in Costa Rica, was aiding the enterprise. Reflecting a concern
about the forthrightness of CIA witnesses that was also voiced by other committee members, Sen.
William Cohen (R-Maine) lectured Fiers that "when you are called to testify, I think your obligation
runs to something broader and higher than just the agency." Fiers testified that he believed he had
been caught in a "nutcracker" situation when he took the job of running the CIA's Nicaraguan
operation in October 1984, days after Congress passed the Boland amendment prohibiting US aid
to the contras fighting the government of Nicaragua. In the testimony and exhibits released Aug. 25,
Fiers testified there was "considerable evidence...that people in and around (former contra leader)
Eden Pastora were in fact involved in cocaine-running to the United States to raise revenue for their
cause." Because of the allegations, Fiers said "it was right not to deal with" Pastora, who attempted
for a time to open a southern front from Costa Rica against the Sandinista government. Discussing
what he called "the remnants of Pastora's people," Fiers said, "We developed information that they
were receiving money from cocaine trafficking." [The committees disclosed they had been unable to
corroborate allegations of "US government-condoned drug trafficking by contra leaders and contra
organizations or that contra leaders or organizations did in fact take part in such activity," according
to a July 23 letter to Rep. Lee H. Hamilton (D-Ind.), chairman of the House panel, that was released
with the Aug. 25 exhibits. The House investigators interviewed hundreds of individuals, reviewed
contra financial records and the files of eight government agencies and discovered "almost all of
these allegations orginate from persons indicted or convicted of drug smuggling."] In October 1986,
after Congress approved $100 million for contra aid, Fiers said that CIA Director William Casey
approved an attempt to solicit additional funds for the contras from Taiwan, which had already
given $2 million. Apparently, the CIA believed they needed another $8 million to $10 million.
Fiers, who worked closely with Marine Lt. Col. North for several years, said the former National
Security Council staff aide had a penchant for stretching the truth. "I never knew Col. North to be
an absolute liar," Fiers said, "but I never took anything he said at face value because I knew that
he was bombastic and embellished the record, and threw curves, speed balls and spitballs to get
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 1 of 3

LADB Article Id: 076187
ISSN: 1089-1560

what he wanted, and I knew it and I knew it well." Pressed by Sen. Sam Nunn (D-Ga.) to explain
North's performance before the committees, Fiers went on to say, "I have seen Col. North play
fast and loose with the facts. And I think the record will substantiate that. But, on the other hand, I
believe that from where I sit, from the glimpses I saw of this thing (North's televised testimony) as
the train windows went by, there was a lot of fact in what he said, too." Fiers also shed some light
on one of the unanswered questions of the investigation: How the contras were financed after July
1986, when government-supplied humanitarian aid had ended and almost no funds were provided
from contributions or the proceeds from US arms sales to Iran. They borrowed. The contras, Fiers
said, "started to accumulate a debt...It was very clear that they were not, I repeat not, getting any
money." From July forward, he said, "there were no deliveries of any type, either arms or food...that
went to the resistance forces." Fiers testified that he took over the Central American post at the time
the CIA inspector general was investigating the agency's distribution of a manual to the contras
on guerrilla warfare that advocated "selective use of violence" to neutralize Sandinista political
targets. "I saw the devastating impact of five letters of reprimand (received by those involved in
the manual's distribution)," Fiers said and determined that he would run the task force "so that all
the liability, the political heat, falls on me." During his testimony, however, Fiers repeatedly was
presented with cables, notes and memos describing activities with the contras that he said he failed
to recall or were in error. He could not recollect an August 1985 cable discussing a controversial
airfield being built in Costa Rica for the North resupply network, although he drafted a reply to it.
"I don't recall having read the thing, but obviously I did read it," he said. Although Fiers testified
that he learned of the participants in North's operations throughout 1986, Fiers failed to name any
of them last Dec. 9, when he appeared before the Senate intelligence committee. When Sen. David
Boren (D-Okla.) asked him why he did not, Fiers responded: "I can't figure why." Later he added:
"I was walking a line once again as a member of a team...It was a very tense sort of moment in
time. I was one of the first ones off the block. I was exposed. I was nervous. And I was not going
to perjure myself." Reflecting on the Oct. 14 hearing, when Abrams denied any US government
involvement with the contra resupply plane that was shot down, Fiers said, "I was taken aback by
the statement...Mr. George was taken aback by his statement." "I didn't know what the status of Mr.
Abrams' knowledgeability was...I didn't ask him how he got there. I didn't get involved with it. I
didn't understand. I didn't ask him about it. I just let it sit there," he said. As for George, Fiers said,
he "had the broad strokes, he knew that Ollie (North) had been around and was involved, (but) he
didn't know as much detail of the involvement as I did." Asked about his Oct. 14 testimony, Fiers
replied: "It's all part of a passivity that I described to the committee just to get through troubled
waters and get on to the next program." Fiers also told the committees that: By the spring of 1986,
he had a "pretty clear understanding" of what North was doing to support the contras. He noted
that North passed out photographs of a secret airstrip in Costa Rica to a "whole gaggle" of senior
administration officials. "I told Ollie, `You ought to keep your mouth shut, you ought not to talk so
much.'" The CIA found out about the contra aid network directed by North and even had reports
on some of the arms purchases as they happened. One CIA cable from March 1985, released by the
committees, noted that retired major general Richard Secord was buying arms through a Canadian
broker who quoted him as saying American authorities would not stop the shipment because "he
was one of them." In early 1986, when Congress relaxed its restrictions on aiding the contras, Fiers
acknowledged allowing his field operatives too much leeway in aiding the contras. "I got a little too
rambunctious," he said, "like a colt that got out of the barn to play, and I pulled myself in. I didn't
do it all myself. My task force lawyer was whispering like Jiminy Cricket in my ear. I probably got
us a little too far forward-leaning at one point in time and then pulled us back." Aug. 27: Documents
©2011 The University of New Mexico,
Latin American & Iberian Institute.
All rights reserved.

Page 2 of 3

LADB Article Id: 076187
ISSN: 1089-1560

and testimony released this week show that the CIA's advice was often overlooked in the Iran affair.
Among the disclosures were the testimony by Alan Fiers, the chief of the agency's Central America
task force, that the CIA had failed to provide a complete set of its intelligence reporting on Central
America to the House Select Committee on Intelligence. Rep. Louis Stokes (D-Ohio), chairman of
the House Intelligence Committee, disclosed that in 1985, the agency withheld three reports on
the contras. He said the agency had agreed to provide its raw reports to a House committee staff
member, Richard Giza. Stokes said one of the reports disclosed the involvement of retired major
general Richard Secord in buying arms for the contras in March 1985; another said the air resupply
operations began in Nov 1985, and the third mentioned arms shipments by South Africa to the
contras. In a deposition, Lieut. Col. Robert A. Earl, a North deputy, said that North returned to his
office last Nov. 21, saying he had attended a high-level White House meeting and that he had bee
"designated the scapegoat" for the Iran-contra affair. North did not say who had told him he would
be cast in this role. Earl also made these points: North at one point considered the idea of giving
the contras money that had been solicited for hostage operations from H. Ross Perot, the Texas
billionaire. The administration was moving forward with a plan for "damage control" that had three
phases. Initially, the plan was to flatly deny dealing with Iran. When that failed, the administration
was prepared to brief Congress on the broad outlines. When that too proved insufficient, "phase
three" was begun with the destruction of documents and North's role as a scapegoat. Sept. 1:
Independent counsel Lawrence E. Walsh is expected to seek an interview with President Reagan
about the Iran-contra affair, probably this fall, before pressing ahead with criminal charges against
some of his former aides, according to informed sources. Walsh will not talk about the progress
of his inquiry, but sources familiar with the investigation say he still must collect a considerable
amount of evidence before obtaining a broad conspiracy indictment against Lt. Col. Oliver L. North,
the fired National Security Council aide; Rear Adm. John M. Poindexter, former national security
adviser, and others. Indictments are now expected in late October or November at the earliest.
In addition to the work still to be done by his office, the sources said Walsh and his prosecutors
have decided to wait until after the Senate-House Iran-contra committees make their final report.
Committee officials say they hope to do this by early October, but they say it is "a massive job" and
could take a bit longer. (Basic data from several reports by WASHINGTON POST, NEW YORK
TIMES)

-- End --
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